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Heritage and Brexit i  
 
In what is traditionally known as ‘the west’, it feels like a very uncertain world at the 
moment and this has become manifest in the political processes of many European 
countries and the USA. Uncertainty has been created by structural changes in the global 
economy (‘globalisation’), enduring austerity politics following the financial crisis of 
2008, climate change, refugee crises, and the impact of terrorism. In many countries 
there has been something of a retrenchment and reaction by polities against these global 
currents. This is manifest, for example, in elections in 2016 and 2017 in the United 
Kingdom, Austria, France, Germany and the Netherlands as well as most dramatically 
in the election of Donald Trump in the USA. As Heather Campbell (2016) wrote in this 
journal of Brexit, the momentous decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European 
Union following a referendum on 23 June 2016, if there is a common characteristic here 
it is that we are often seeing an ‘anti-vote’; an antagonism towards the established 
political class, ‘experts’ and the ‘liberal metropolitan elite’, often linked to a new wave 
of nationalism (Jennings & Stoker, 2017; Webber & Burrows, forthcoming; Winlow, 
Hall, & Treadwell, 2017, pp. 197–208). The vote arguably highlights deep cultural 
schisms within the UK. These are rooted in very different imaginaries of the past and 
their uses in the present. Brexit, we would argue, is therefore, alongside its other 
characteristics, very much a heritage project; that is, the past is used for contemporary 
purposes and as a future-making practice. This has implications for what heritage ‘is’ 
and what it does, in a post-Brexit country.  
The Brexit process has generated a series of clichés that can be considered both vacuous 
and difficult to pin down. Nevertheless, like most clichés they perhaps contain some 
kernel of an issue that is worth interrogating. Brexit clichés that have been widely 
reproduced include ‘we want our country back’ and ‘our once great country’. These are 
highly emotive and contentious phrases. They suggest a nostalgic social conservatism 
encompassing both a sense of loss and a sense of place (Clarke, 2016). They relate to a 
wish to recover an imaginary of a past that celebrates a de-problematised ‘great’ British 
national identity, without acknowledging the dark side of this history or the inequalities 
this still reproduces in contemporary society (May, 2017). Thus, Brexit presents 
potentially profound implications for how heritage might be defined and used in the 
future. Brexit-supporting politicians have sought to overtly mobilise heritage in Brexit 
politics, playing upon old referents in engendering new nationalisms. Right-wing 
commentators aim to give a respectable sheen to this insular and rather xenophobic 
construction of national identity by calling up a mythic past (e.g. Murray, 2017). 
References are made to Empire and the Commonwealth (even, absurdly, to ‘Empire 
2.0’) as well as war-related tropes such as the Blitz, Nazis and so on as part of 
constructing an island nation identity; a project that has also been deliberately cultivated 
in the school curriculum by Conservative government ministers (Bhambra, 2013).   
For heritage, this can be seen as taking things back to their roots. The rise of the modern 
conception of heritage is closely linked with the development of the modern nation 
state; heritage was part of the apparatus of defining national identity through a project 
of belonging and ‘othering’. Heritage is an integral part of what Benedict Anderson 
(1983) termed ‘Imagined Communities’ and the overt use of heritage in nation-building 
and nation-destruction has continued on the global stage through to modern times (e.g. 
Bevan, 2006). Yet over time, the heritage project has acquired a range of other 
instrumental roles. Specifically, in recent decades two larger, wider social, economic 
and political forces have come into play in the practice of heritage that encompass but 
far transcend their impact on heritage alone and which, for shorthand, we have called 
‘liberalism’ and ‘neo-liberalism’. Whilst the drive for these arises from very different 
social constituencies, they have both been facilitated by the partial collapse of the 
modernist project, which has enabled more heterogeneous approaches to heritage to 
take root.  
The cultural turn in the social sciences originating in the 1970s with its challenge to 
scientific rationalism eventually filtered through to planning (see e.g. Rivero, 2017) and 
the heritage world (see e.g. Hewison, 1987; Lowenthal, 1985) and this led to a sustained 
critique of expert dominance of heritage definition and management (see e.g. Smith, 
2006). This discourse of ‘liberalism’ has had implications for defining more pluralist 
conceptions of heritage, pushing the heritage sector to make efforts towards a wider 
social engagement beyond its historic audience. In the late 1990s/ early 2000s this was 
given impetus by the Labour Government that required all government departments to 
demonstrate their role in supporting a process of social inclusion (Pendlebury, 
Townshend, & Gilroy, 2004). Whilst the manifestation of this discourse has changed – 
the focus is now upon ‘diversity’– the liberal discourse on heritage is very much alive 
both in the heritage sector and in relation to ‘hot’ heritage issues. For example, there are 
active campaigns to rename British places associated with figures prominent in the 
slave trade. It has been agreed, for instance, that, following a programme of 
refurbishment, Colston Hall in Bristol be renamed for this reason (Saner, 2017). At 
heart, such liberalism in the hands of policy-makers remains a nation-building agenda; 
but seeks to create new and more diverse definitions of national identity.  
It was also in the 1970s that neo-liberal economic approaches began to be asserted and 
these have assumed dominance across much of Europe despite (indeed, reinforced by) 
the global financial crisis and austerity. This has had significant direct and indirect 
consequences for heritage management processes. Directly, both government policy and 
market processes have led to a more overt commodification of heritage; we increasingly 
use and reify heritage as an economic good rather than protect it as a cultural good. 
Showcasing good practices of heritage-led regeneration usually means proving that 
heritage assets were instrumental in economic development. Indirectly, these processes 
have been accelerated in recent years by a desperation in many localities to capture any 
possible economic activity and, as a consequence of austerity, there is also a diminished 
capacity from the local state to manage change.  
These philosophies, liberalism and neo-liberalism, are often in competition with each 
other, but they are also both outward-facing, cosmopolitan projects. In their very 
different ways they expose ideas of heritage, by breaking out of traditional conceptions 
of cultural worth and national identity and using it, on the one hand, as part of a political 
critique of traditional nationalism and, on the other, as a globalised economic 
commodity. 
Returning to Brexit, such cosmopolitanism seems to have been a factor in the 
referendum result, with some commentators identifying a profound social schism at the 
heart of the divisive result. For example, David Goodhartii (2017) divides the British 
population between ‘somewheres’ and ‘anywheres’iii; between the well-educated and 
cosmopolitan metropolitan elite (the ‘anywheres’) and an older, more provincial 
population (the ‘somewheres’) who feel out of step with social change and an image of 
modern Britain represented by the demographic change of immigration. These 
classifications are overly-simplistic but do pick up upon one strong theme characteristic 
of Brexit-discourse; that those disconnected from cosmopolitanism and globalisation, or 
having to deal with its unequal and unfair consequences, feel anger or resentment that 
was articulated in the vote. This is as much a cultural disconnect as an economic one 
(see also Smith, 2017). Again, this is highly debateable, and other commentators have 
downplayed the significance of social division (Jones, 2017). Whatever the precise 
sociological reality, if we accept that one of the drivers for Brexit is social 
conservatism, that another is a reaction against some of the consequences of globalism 
and that there is a germ of truth in the idea of somewheres and anywheres, we can see 
that there is a potential tension between the values of the somewheres and the 
reformulations of heritage suggested by liberalism and neo-liberalism. Somewheres 
might perhaps be thought to relate more to traditional signifiers of heritage. Indeed, 
Goodhart argues it is precisely because of liberalism and neo-liberalism that a social 
schism has been created and a disconnection with the values of a substantial part of the 
population has occurred. If we give some credence to this view, what are the practical 
implications for heritage? 
First, it would seem that liberal values are more immediately under-challenge than neo-
liberal values; new nationalisms and anti-immigration discourses with concomitant 
antipathy to policies of diversity represent a major challenge to the liberal project, 
including in the heritage sector. Whilst most analysis would suggest neo-liberalism was 
the root cause of the global financial crisis, neo-liberal approaches have strengthened 
their grip on global politics and economics (Peck, Brenner, & Theodore, 2017) 
(although the surprisingly good performance of Jeremy Corbyn-led Labour in the UK 
2017 General Election might be indicative of a swing of momentum). It is impossible to 
know exactly how challenges to a liberal agenda will come to ground or tangibly 
manifest themselves, but some challenge to the status quo seems inevitable. As a hint of 
what might be to come, some in the right-wing media were very critical of the National 
Trust’s recent celebration of LGBTQ history on the 50th anniversary of the partial 
decriminalisation of homosexuality (Delingpole, 2016) and more recently the 
suggestion that National Trust volunteers wear rainbow lanyards at one property led to a 
media storm (Pochin, 2017). If we acknowledge the role of heritage in the process of 
imagining and negotiating the future, what role do we want it to perform? And how 
should the heritage sector respond to this? 
At its most anodyne, heritage can be presented as ‘a reassuringly warm and cuddly 
blanket’ (Ashworth, 2006; 393) by those seeking to sell heritage and those presenting a 
liberal affirming vision of heritage alike. This ignores the fact that heritage often has 
ugly and regressive sides, as shown by recent events in Charlottesville (Fortin, 2017). In 
the context of a liberal agenda, ‘political correctness’ may appear threatening for those 
who hold other views, seeming to illiberally close down opinions that do not conform. 
Heritage can be used to engender communal identity but equally it can be divisive. If 
the UK is a divided nation, can it have a united heritage? One response to Brexit is to 
say we need to push an agenda based around diversity and inclusivity even harder, that 
if we include more people in the liberal heritage project, it can be used to build a more 
unified sense of place and nation. The starting point for an alternative strategy would be 
to acknowledge that heritage is contested. In turn this suggests further changing heritage 
processes, the sharing of some professional authority and creation of space for debate. 
Resultant modes of collaborative and dialogic working have been discussed in the 
heritage literature for some time (see e.g. Harrison, 2013; Pendlebury, Townshend, & 
Gilroy, 2004) and are very familiar to planners (see e.g. Healey, 1997). However, 
following Rivero’s (2017) discussion, productive deliberation is difficult; more 
communication does not necessarily mean greater understanding. As he states  
“Merely insisting, however, that we engage populism in whatever form it takes 
as part of the ongoing democratic project offers no guidance in how to do so. It 
leaves outstanding the perplexing question of how we might confront a 
fragmented public and rebuild a common ground on foundations of distrust and 
resentment” (492) 
Alternatively we might consider an institutional design that acknowledges divisions and 
fault lines through a creative process of agonism (see e.g. Mouffe, 2000), using heritage 
to debate the various claims made over the past, recognising that mutually incompatible 
positions are a legitimate and necessary part of democracy (Kisić, 2017). While heritage 
often reproduces hegemonic structures by its framing of historic inequalities and social 
structures, it can also provide a platform for questioning them, stimulating debate and 
learning. Brexit feeds into a debate about re-inscribing, rethinking and reframing 
heritage in different political realms. If the divided referendum vote is indeed a sign that 
the UK is in some ways a divided nation, how can we make sure heritage will be used 
as a platform for debate, to publicly unpack what heritage is used for and what it does 
(Veldpaus & Pendlebury, 2017)? The use of heritage to create a sense of belonging to a 
shared past or future, is equally as entrenched in liberal as anti-liberal discourses, 
depending on who belongs and to what. Rootedness and identity can be conservative, 
progressive, liberal, neo-liberal and more. But if we are to argue for a liberal vision of 
heritage we need to better acknowledge, and challenge, the other realms of heritage that 
exist. 
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 i This commentary has been developed subsequent to an ESRC IAA funded Heritage & Brexit 
Workshop on the 29th of March organised by the authors. Whilst the views presented are our 
own we gratefully acknowledge the insightful contributions from all attendees at that event 
from both the heritage sector and academia. As well as the long-term cultural implications of 
Brexit the event focused upon immediate policy ramifications. For discussions of these see 
Sykes and Ludwig (2016) and in particular, from the briefing prepared by The Heritage 
Alliance (2017), an umbrella group for heritage-sector organisations. 
ii Goodhart is a British left-of-centre commentator who, nevertheless, became something of a 
pariah on the left for arguing during the 2000s of the dangers of disconnection from 
traditional working class voters and a loss of social cohesion by the Labour leadership and 
its liberal approach to immigration (see Goodhart, 2004) .  
iii We acknowledge that whilst Goodhart’s focus is upon ‘somewheres’ and ‘anywheres’ he does 
also have a category of ‘inbetweeners’. 
 
 
                                                 
